The impact of tactical knowledge on integrative and distributive response-in-kind behavior sequences and the ability to shift from distributive to integrative behaviors were examined using data from a prior study. Ninety dyads engaged in a multi-issue joint venture negotiation. Forty-five dyads were provided tactical knowledge and the other 45 were not. Markov chain analysis was used to test the hypotheses. A second-order chain best fit the data. Results showed that negotiators responded-in-kind to both distributive and integrative tactical behavior regardless of tactical knowledge. In line with Weick's (1969) ''double interact'' proposition of interlocked behaviors, negotiators with tactical knowledge were more likely to respond-in-kind to integrative behavior than were those without such knowledge, but only after their previous integrative behavior had been reciprocated. In addition, negotiators with tactical knowledge engaged in longer chains of integrative The authors thank
Negotiation is a highly interdependent process in which each party continuously incorporates information from the other party to develop responses that might lead to resolution of the conflict at hand. In the quest for understanding the process through which conflicts are resolved, researchers have examined the knowledge held by negotiators. Tactical knowledge, gained through experience or instruction, has been shown to influence the types and frequencies of tactics employed (Thompson, 1990; Thompson, 1991; Weingart, Hyder, & Prietula, 1996) . While this indicates what negotiators do, it does not reveal when (or how) they do it. Insight into the latter temporal issue may be gained by discovering how tactical knowledge affects the interaction patterns of negotiation as they unfold over time. This paper attempts to provide that insight by utilizing detailed data from a prior experiment where tactical knowledge was shown to influence the frequency of behavior (Weingart et al., 1996) and exploring the specific effects of tactical knowledge for systematic sequences of response-in-kind negotiator behavior using Markov analysis.
Tactical Knowledge
We view negotiation from the perspective of problem solving, where knowledge of negotiation tactics is applied to resolve the specific negotiation problem at hand (Prietula & Weingart, 1994) . Whereas strategies embody middle-range goals that organize a negotiator's approach, such as ''identify opportunities for mutual gain'' or ''negotiate based on objective criteria'' (Fisher & Ury, 1981; Pruitt, 1983) , tactics implement strategies in terms of specific behavioral components. Tactics include both explicit behaviors (e.g., ''make an opening offer'') and cognitions implicit in the behaviors (e.g., ''frame the task in terms of gains'').
In this study, we focus on the effects of a set of negotiation tactics provided to naive negotiators (i.e., those without experience or training in negotiation) through written descriptions. The tactics provided embody common integrative and distributive tactics shown to influence negotiation outcomes in integrative bargaining tasks (Lewicki & Litterer, 1985; Pruitt, 1981) . Research that has examined the effect of explicit presentation of negotiation tactics on negotiator behavior has found evidence for their influence on frequency of tactical behavior (Hyder, Prietula, & Weingart, in press; Thompson, 1991 , Weingart et al., 1996 . Thompson (1991) found that instruction provided to one negotiatator in a dyad on a single negotiation tactic-either seeking or providing information about issue importance-resulted in more of these behaviors (from the instructed negotiator) and higher joint outcomes (for the dyad). Weingart et al. (1996) and Hyder et al. (in press ) examined the influence of instruction on the frequency of negotiator behavior by providing both negotiators with several negotiation tactics. In these two studies, negotiator knowledge influenced tactical behavior (and joint outcomes); however, knowledge differentially influenced the use of integrative versus distributive behaviors-increasing the former but having no impact on the latter.
Negotiation tactics are typically categorized as being either integrative or distributive in nature (Lewicki & Litterer, 1985; Pruitt, 1981) , though sometimes specific categorizations may require an examination of the context of use. Both types of tactics are considered necessary for the individual negotiator to reach a satisfactory agreement on a mixed-motive task (Pruitt, 1981) . It is important to note that in this study ''integrative'' and ''distributive'' characterize tactics and not individuals. Consequently, any given individual may (and in the best case, should) exhibit both types of tactics as the negotiation unfolds, as both types play complementary roles en route to the Pareto optimal frontier. Integrative tactics generally address (and attempt to accommodate) the underlying interests of both parties, or such is their effect. Examples of integrative tactics provided to negotiators in this study include trading off across issues, exchanging information about priorities, and avoiding a zero-sum assumption. These common tactics are useful in the generation of joint gain, typical of a cooperative approach to negotiation. Distributive tactics, on the other hand, seek to create individual gain by acquiring unilateral concessions. Distributive tactics are appropriate when issues are equally valued by both parties (i.e., distributive issues). In this study, distributive tactics provided to negotiators include appearing firm and persuasive argumentation of one's position. (See Weingart et al., 1996 , and the Methods section below for a more complete description of the tactics provided to negotiators in this study.)
When naive negotiators are provided with written descriptions of negotiation tactics, those descriptions will likely either cue existing knowledge (if they have it) or provide new knowledge (if they do not). Whether existing knowledge is cued or new knowledge is provided depends on the knowledge held by the individual negotiator. Previous research tells us that naive negotiators (almost as a default strategy) typically engage in distributive behaviors that divide resources (Weingart, Thompson, Bazerman, & Carroll, 1990) , as they are motivated by the assumption that negotiation situations are zero-sum (i.e., win-lose) in nature (Thompson & Hastie, 1990) . This suggests that naive negotiators have relevant knowledge about certain distributive tactics and perhaps less knowledge of certain integrative tactics. Therefore, providing negotiators with descriptions of integrative tactics should be more likely to provide new knowledge (Weingart et al., 1996) . While negotiators are expected to engage in both integrative and distributive tactics during the course of the negotiation, negotiators provided with mixed tactical knowledge should increase their use of integrative behavior as compared to those without this tactical knowledge. However, the use of distributive tactics should not differ across conditions.
Patterns of Tactical Behavior
By focusing on frequencies of behavior, studies (including Weingart et al., 1996) have begun to explicate the manner in which knowledge impacts tactical behavior; however, they have not revealed the full complexity of negotiation processes. Frequencies of behavior tell us the amount of a specific tactic being evidenced, but not when that tactic is being applied. In contrast, temporal sequences of behavior tell us whether negotiating dyads are combining tactics into a coherent and useful strategy.
Such a detailed process approach to the study of negotiation views negotiation as a series of actions and reactions where recurring patterns ''constrain interaction by reducing the probability that other categories of talk will occur'' (Putnam, 1983, p. 469) . Consider the situation where one party provides preference information, ''I want the air temperature to be at least 70 degrees.'' If this distributive behavior is responded to in a similar fashion, ''Well, I can't have it over 68 degrees,'' and the use of distributive behaviors becomes a pattern, it could drive out other, more integrative patterns of behaviors. Thus, patterns of tactical behavior used by negotiators reveal information about the strategies being employed (Donohue, 1981; Sillars, 1980) . We believe that whether tactical behaviors are responded to in kind is an important issue in negotiation. Response-in-kind occurs when one party responds to the other with the same type of behavior that the other party used during the previous speaking turn. Many behaviors, such as procedural statements, singleissue and multi-issue offers, trade-offs, threats, avoidance of conflict, and affect statements, have been shown to be responded to in kind (c.f. Donohue, 1981; Putnam, 1983; Sillars, 1980; . Putnam and Jones (1982) suggest that response-in-kind to integrative tactical behavior is a critical factor in moving from distributive to integrative bargaining. For example, if a trade-off is made and reciprocated, a message of cooperation is communicated. But, if the trade-off is not reciprocated, we might expect a shift to competitive, distributive exchanges. Two studies have directly examined, and found evidence of, response-in-kind to integrative tactical behavior (Putnam & Jones, 1982; .
Alternatively, response-in-kind to distributive behavior communicates negative affect or competition. Putnam and Jones (1982) also found that when distributive behaviors were reciprocated in labor negotiations, the conflict tended to escalate. Results from studies of marital interaction comparing well-adjusted couples to poorly adjusted couples also support this suggestion (e.g., Gottman, Markman, & Notarius, 1977) . In an experiment where participants negotiated word processing services for a term paper, found evidence of response-inkind to distributive behavior, but did not find differences in patterns of distributive response-in-kind across high performing versus low performing dyads.
A social norm driving response-in-kind behavior is the norm of reciprocity. Reciprocity, as conceptualized by Gouldner (1960) , involves the equivalent exchange of benefits. That is, when one party provides the other with a valued benefit, the other completes the exchange with a similarly valued benefit. Correspondingly, this norm of reciprocity also extends to the exchange of negative benefits, such as the exchange of false information. The existence of a universal norm of reciprocity allows for the first party to provide the initial benefit with an expectation that the other will experience a sense of obligation to engage in reciprocal exchange.
Some, but not all, of negotiation tactical behavior can be considered an exchange of benefits. Provision of information about preferences and the making of threats are examples of positive and negative benefits, respectively, that might be subject to feelings of obligation and reciprocal exchange. However, other behaviors, such as logrolling and substantiation of position are not directly benefits-based, and, therefore, are not subject to the norm of reciprocity, as defined by Gouldner (1960) . Instead, these behaviors represent approaches to solving the problem at hand where conscious or subconscious mimicry might drive response-in-kind to these behaviors. Conscious mimicry involves modeling the behavior exhibited by another party, with the assumption that the behavior is appropriate for the task at hand. From a problem solving perspective, elements of the task, such as the behavior of the other party or the task as presented, can consciously cue certain tactics and assumptions over others (Chi, Feltovich, & Glaser, 1981) . In contrast, subconscious mimicry or accommodation is a process in which behaviors tend to converge in kind as a conversation proceeds (Giles, Coupland, & Coupland, 1991) . Convergence occurs when individuals subconsciously adapt to each other's communicative behaviors and has been evidenced in studies of speech style (e.g., Coupland, 1984) as well as message content (e.g., Ehrlich & Graeven, 1971) . Similarly, from a problem solving perspective, it is well established that cues from the situation can also automatically trigger initial strategies without conscious deliberation (Anderson, 1983) , an observation that has been explicitly related to social cognition settings (Bargh, 1994) .
In contrast to previous research on negotiation sequences that has focused on response-in-kind to specific categories of identical tactical behaviors (e.g., offers, trade-offs, threats), in this paper we examine response-in-kind to more general categories of distributive and integrative behavior. Use of more general categories allows us to capture response-in-kind that is not limited to identical behaviors, but includes behavior of similar strategic intent. We recognize that behaviors that are complementary at the tactical level (e.g., questions and information provision about priorities), represent the same general strategic approach (integrative, problem-solving). Thus, this paper focuses on tendencies to respond in kind to behaviors within the same category of function.
Breaking Chains of Distributive Tactical Behavior
These general tendencies are important in setting the tone of a negotiation. Negotiation scholars have noted that one of the most difficult aspects of a successful negotiation is trying to balance the integrative and distributive components of mixed-motive negotiations (Lax & Sebenius, 1986; Pruitt, 1981) . Once a negotiation takes on a distributive tone, it is very difficult to shift it to a more cooperative interaction. Research on conflict spirals, or the escalation of conflict into a destructive cycle (Blake & Mouton, 1964; Folger & Poole, 1984) , has focused on sequential behavior. These studies have shown that escalation of conflict can be offset by responding to offensive tactics with either defensive tactics or integrative responses (Donohue, 1981; Donohue, Diez, & Hamilton, 1984; Putnam & Jones, 1982) . Donohue (1981) examined distributive negotiations and found that successful negotiators balanced extreme attacks with extreme regressive moves. A regressive move was characterized by supporting the other's position or introducing a new idea as a way to keep the negotiation progressing. Impasse dyads demonstrated a lower percentage of these extreme moves than did agreement dyads. found that whereas both low efficiency dyads (i.e., dyads that achieved outcomes of lower Pareto efficiency) and high efficiency dyads responded to distributive behaviors in a complementary fashion (i.e., with integrative behaviors), the content of those responses differed. For example, high efficiency dyads responded to negative reactions with requests for information as a means of gaining better understanding of the opponent, whereas low efficiency dyads responded to negative reactions by suggesting trade-offs.
In sum, the research relating to sequential processes in integrative negotiation suggests that a strong norm for reciprocity exists in negotiation, with the response-in-kind of integrative behavior potentially facilitating and the responsein-kind of distributive behavior hindering the negotiation process. However, one possible method of interrupting a conflict spiral (the exchange of distributive tactics) is the interjection of an integrative tactic in an attempt to shift to more cooperative behaviors. While this is difficult to do and may not occur frequently, it can be effective. The question remaining is whether this can be accomplished (or influenced) through the presence of information on negotiation tactics.
Hypotheses: Knowledge and Negotiation Processes
The negotiation literature indicates that dyads that are provided with information about integrative tactics engage in those tactics more frequently than dyads that are not (Hyder et al., in press; Thompson, 1991; Weingart et al., 1996) . However, frequency is only part of the story. To significantly influence the negotiation process, this tactical behavior must be enacted in responsive, timely, and potentially meaningful ways. In contrast to previous research that has used static conceptualizations of negotiation processes, in this study we examine the influence of negotiator knowledge on behavior sequences. To accomplish this, we incorporate the data from a prior study where the impact of tactical knowledge was demonstrated (Weingart et al., 1996) . In that study, dyads that were presented with tactical knowledge engaged in more integrative behaviors and achieved higher joint outcomes than dyads that received no such information. Additionally, the integrative behaviors served as mediators of the knowledge-outcome effect. In this study, we recoded data from Weingart et al. (1996) to explore whether the availability of tactical knowledge impacts response-in-kind to specific integrative and distributive tactical behavior sequences and the ability to shift from distributive to integrative behavior.
Because there is a strong norm for reciprocity in negotiation, all negotiators are expected to respond in kind to integrative and distributive behavior rather than switch to a different approach to resolving the conflict (Putnam & Jones, 1982; . Thus, Hypothesis 1 below attempts to replicate the general expectation of response-in-kind. However, negotiators with tactical knowledge (i.e., who have been presented with a list of integrative, distributive, and equivocal tactics) are expected to respond in kind to integrative tactics to a greater extent than are negotiators without tactical knowledge (i.e., who have not been presented with the list), and should resist counterproductive norms of responding in kind to distributive behavior, because they have a broader array of novel integrative tactics at their disposal. By avoiding the zero-sum assumption, they can obtain the benefits of sharing information about priorities, packaging offers, and trading off across issues. The presence of distributive tactics in the tactical knowledge manipulation should not influence behavior because these tactics, while useful, are already held by naive negotiators. 1 Thus, we expect the presence of tactical knowledge to increase the probability of integrative response-in-kind (Hypothesis 2), and to attenuate the likelihood of distributive response-in-kind (Hypothesis 3) as compared to naive negotiators. As a corollary to Hypothesis 3, we also expect negotiators with tactical knowledge to be more likely to respond to distributive with integrative behavior than those without tactical knowledge. Specifically, we propose the following:
Hypothesis 1: Regardless of tactical knowledge, negotiators will be more likely to respond in kind to integrative and distributive behavior than switch to behavior of another form (i.e., respond to integrative behavior with distributive behavior, and vice versa).
Hypothesis 2: Negotiators with tactical knowledge will respond to integrative behaviors with integrative behaviors to a greater extent than will negotiators without tactical knowledge.
Hypothesis 3: Negotiators with tactical knowledge will respond to distributive behaviors with distributive behaviors to a lesser extent than will negotiators without tactical knowledge.
Corollary: Negotiators with tactical knowledge will respond to distributive behaviors with integrative behaviors to a greater extent than will negotiators without tactical knowledge.
In addition to examining how negotiators respond to their opponent, information regarding the efficacy of tactical knowledge can be gained by examining the durability of behavior. While our previous hypotheses focused on the immediate response of one party to the other, here we focus on maintenance of one's strategy, regardless of how the other party responds. If tactical knowledge (rather than response-in-kind) drives behavior sequences, we expect negotiators with knowledge to maintain their integrative strategy over time. That is, negotiators with knowledge will be more likely to continue employing integrative behaviors during subsequent speaking turns in a repeated attempt to problem-solve. This persistent pattern of behavior would serve to maintain a constructive approach to the negotiation. In contrast, negotiators without knowledge should be more likely to maintain distributive behaviors across speaking turns, whereas negotiators with knowledge will switch to integrative behaviors sooner. Thus, we hypothesize the following:
Hypothesis 4: After employing an integrative behavior, a negotiator with tactical knowledge will continue employing integrative behaviors for a longer time than will a negotiator without tactical knowledge, regardless of the other party's behavior.
Hypothesis 5: After employing a distributive behavior, a negotiator with tactical knowledge will continue employing distributive behaviors for a shorter time than will a negotiator without tactical knowledge, regardless of the other party's behavior.
METHOD

Subjects
In the original study and for the current analysis, 180 undergraduate subjects participated. The undergraduates at this university can be characterized as naive negotiators. The use of this population allowed us to avoid differences in negotiator experience prior to entering the negotiation. Subjects either participated to fulfill a research requirement in an introductory organizational behavior or marketing course or responded to advertisements posted on campus. Subjects were paid approximately $.01 per point earned for themselves in the negotiated agreement, resulting in compensation ranging from $1.50 to $7.00. 2 In addition, the subjects who responded to the advertisements received a base rate of $5.00 for attending the experiment. Subject source was evenly distributed across conditions.
Sixty-seven of the subjects were female and were randomly distributed across conditions. This resulted in 55 same sex dyads (16 female, 39 male) and 35 mixed sex dyads. Composition of dyads did not covary with experimental condition.
Task
Subjects participated in a two-party multi-issue negotiation case entitled ''Landers Market.'' In this negotiation task, two subjects assume the roles of entrepreneurs, a florist or a baker, who are considering the possibility of a joint business opportunity. The florist has approached the baker with the proposal of combining both businesses in one location and calling it Landers Market.
Four issues remained to be resolved, each issue offering nine alternatives. These issues included: hiring, training, and supervision of clerical staff; building maintenance costs; division of advertising costs; and air temperature. Subjects were presented with a sheet of paper describing the issues and the alternatives within the issues. They were also provided with a payoff schedule listing descriptions of each option within each issue and its corresponding numerical point value. For example, one option for the clerks issue was that the baker and florist hire clerks together to work in both departments, supervise clerks together, and pay clerks depending on the hours worked for each store. Subjects were randomly assigned the role of florist or baker.
Two of the issues to be settled in Landers Market, temperature and maintenance, were distributive issues. These issues were worth the same amount of points for each negotiator, with preferences on these issues going in opposite directions. Consequently, one party's gain was equal to the other party's loss. The other two issues, advertising and clerks, were integrative issues, worth different amounts to the negotiators, making tradeoffs across these two issues possible. Thus, the case had integrative potential. If the negotiators agreed on the midpoint for all issues, they would have settled on a strictly distributive solution and the total joint profit would be 440 points. If the negotiators correctly traded-off fully across the integrative issues (i.e., one negotiator conceding entirely on the clerk issue, the other conceding entirely on advertising), joint profit would increase to the maximum of 560 points, with both parties benefiting.
Four versions of the case, each with a different issue ordering, were generated and their use was counterbalanced across conditions. Issue order differed with respect to the presentation of integrative (I) versus distributive (D) issues. Versions included: IDDI, DDII, IDID, DIDI.
Procedure
Subjects were informed they would be participating in a negotiation, each representing a store interested in developing Landers Market. During the experimental session, subjects were seated on opposite sides of a table with a chest-high barrier. This barrier prevented the negotiators from seeing the other party's information sheets but did not interfere with visual contact. The negotiation task was presented to the subjects, including background information, individual role instructions, and individual issue payoff schedules. Subjects were not provided with their opponent's payoff schedule and were requested not to explicitly divulge their own point information from their payoff schedule. Each subject was also informed of their walk-away value: their current situation was worth 99 points and they should only reach an agreement if it was worth 100 or more points to themselves.
After the negotiation task was presented, a prenegotiation questionnaire was given to ensure the critical aspects of the case were understood (i.e., one's most important issue and the walk-away value). The subjects were allowed to refer to the case while they were answering the questionnaire. If any of the questions was answered incorrectly, subjects were asked to refer back to the case to correct their answers. After completing the prenegotiation questionnaire, the subjects were informed they had 1 h to negotiate the case. The session was videotaped so that the negotiation process could be coded and analyzed. If necessary, subjects were informed when 5 min remained in the scheduled session. However, they were allowed to continue negotiating if they did not choose to impasse. After completing the negotiation, a debriefing session was held and subjects were excused.
Tactical Knowledge Manipulation
Two tactical knowledge conditions were examined: tactical knowledge presented (TK) and tactical knowledge not presented (NTK). There were a total of 90 dyads, with 45 dyads in the TK condition (both members of the dyad received the manipulation) and 45 dyads in the NTK condition (neither member received the manipulation).
After completing the prenegotiation questionnaire, subjects in the TK condition were separated and given a list of negotiation tactics with descriptions and examples. This list included six negotiation tactics. Mixed together in a random order, these tactics included two distributive tactics: appear firm, use persuasive arguments; two integrative tactics: do not assume a zero-sum game, trade off issues; and two equivocal tactics: set goals, exchange information. 3 See Weingart et al. (1996) for the text of the tactical descriptions.
The selection of this set of tactics was influenced by research showing that negotiators are motivated by concerns about oneself and the other party (Pruitt & Rubin, 1986) , two common concerns in mixed-motive conflict situations. These tactics represent the primary mechanisms for distributing resources and integrating interests for negotiations in which the set of issues is fixed and joint gain can be realized by trading off across differentially valued issues-like the task used in this study. The tactics provided to negotiators were not intended to be representative of the entire set of potential negotiation tactics. Other tactics, such as generating creative solutions or making threats, were not included because they either were not allowable strategies for reaching agreement (e.g., participants
were not allowed to agree to options outside the provided set of issues and options) or they were not expected to be effective in an experimental setting (e.g., threats of future action were not likely to be influential given the lack of future interaction).
After reading the list, subjects were given a questionnaire requesting them to state the meaning of each of the tactics in their own words. The subjects were not allowed to refer to the list while answering the questionnaire. When the questionnaire was completed, the list of tactical descriptions was returned to the subjects. If any of the tactics was recalled incorrectly, the subject was referred back to the handout to correct the answer. If necessary, verbal instructions were provided by the experimenter to further explain the tactics.
Process Analysis: Measures
Coding scheme. The verbal interaction of the dyad was coded from the videotapes of the negotiation. The coding scheme, based on one developed by Weingart, Simons, Robinson, and Brett (1990) , discussed in Weingart et al. (1996) and used in related research (Hyder et al., in press), focused on both integrative and distributive behaviors. A set of general rules was provided to the coders, including the rule that multiple codes could be assigned to each speaking turn, but that no more than one code could be assigned to a single subject-verb-object set.
The coding scheme identified several different negotiating behaviors, including offers, information provision, questions, procedural comments, and reactions. These more general behaviors were further divided into a total of 12 categories reflecting distributive, integrative, and other tactics. Distributive categories focused on single issues or positions on those issues. Integrative categories focused on multiple issues and priorities across issues. Finally, the other coding categories included procedural comments, positive reactions, negative reactions, and miscellaneous comments, but were not included in the current analyses. The categories used are identified below in italics.
Five distributive behaviors were coded: (1) single-issue offers, (2) infopreferences-providing information about preferences within an issue, (3) quespreferences-questions about the other party's preferences within an issue, (4) substantiation-arguments for one's position on an issue, and (5) quessubstantiation-questions about the other party's arguments. 4 Three integrative behaviors were coded: (1) multi-issue offers, (2) info-priorities-providing information about priorities across multiple issues, (3) ques-priorities-questions about the other party's priorities across issues. 5 Coding process. Prior to coding, the videotapes were unitized, using the speaking turn as the unit of analysis. A total of 12,775 speaking turns were identified in the data set. Unitizing reliability was high (Guetzkow's U ϭ .09; Guetzkow, 1950) . Pairs of three research assistants, blind to the research hypotheses, independently coded each dyad. Codes were compared across coders for every dyad and disagreements were resolved by jointly viewing the videotape and deciding upon the appropriate code. Prior to reconciliation, intercoder reliability (Cohen's kappa, 1960) was computed for each category from a subset of dyads (28 dyads, 4302 codes) and ranged from .75 to .89 ( p Ͻ .001 for all categories; Fleiss, 1971) .
Prior to analysis, the data set was reduced to one coded behavior per speaking turn. This was necessary to allow us to focus on transitions across speaking turns. Wherever multiple behaviors occurred during a speaking turn, a dominance scheme, similar to the one used by Weingart, Bennett, and Brett (1993) , was applied to eliminate less substantial (or less dominant) behaviors. Multi-issue offers were considered the most dominant category, followed by single-issue offers, info-priorities, info-preferences, substantiation, ques-priorities, quespreferences, and other comments. Of the 12,775 speaking turns identified, 2138 (16.7%) contained more than one code. Eliminating multiple codes resulted in the elimination of 3153 behaviors (19.7%).
Process Analysis: Statistical Methods
Our goal for the process analysis was to identify the significant sequential patterns of tactics during negotiations and compare those sequences across experimental conditions. To do this, we conducted a Markov chain analysis. A Markov chain is a model for a sequence (of behavior) evolving over time with a stochastic component. The key property of a Markov model is that, at any point in time, the probability distribution of the next behavior occurring is assumed to depend on a particular number of behaviors that occurred previously (see Gottman & Roy, 1990 , for a useful summary). Thus, this model allows us to capture the influence of previously communicated behaviors on the engagement of subsequent integrative versus distributive behaviors while controlling for differences in base rate occurrence across categories of behavior. While previous research on dyadic negotiation has examined the influence of a single contiguous tactical behavior on the next (e.g., , this analysis goes beyond that by examining higher level dependencies (i.e., effects of two or more preceding behaviors) involving more general classes of behavior (i.e., integrative versus distributive).
The number of previous behaviors that must be considered (r) is called the order of the chain. In this paper, we are interested in the influence of one party's behavior on the other; therefore, we focus our analysis on the sequence of behaviors that occurs across speaking turns. For example, in a first-order Markov chain (r ϭ 1), the probability distribution of the next behavior depends only on what behavior occurred in the current speaking turn. That is, a response by one party (e.g., ''I disagree'') depends solely on the content of what was just said by the other party (e.g., ''I think the thermostat should be set at 68 degrees''). In a second-order chain (r ϭ 2), the distribution of the next behavior depends only on what happened on the current and previous turns. In this case, a party's response is contingent on the other party's response to the first party's previous statement. Order then is the number of previous states affecting the next state.
Definition of the chain. In defining the chain, the relevant events (or behaviors) must be identified. In this study, the data were encoded into a set of specific tactical behaviors, and these behaviors were then grouped into categories that indicate whether they are distributive, integrative, or neither. The premise underlying our model is that the substantive (i.e., integrative and distributive) behaviors of one party in the negotiation influence behaviors of the other party in the near future. Consequently, we take as the basic input of our analyses the sequence of substantive behaviors (Distributive or Integrative), labeled by the role of the speaker (1 or 2). This leads to a Markov chain with four states labeled D.1, I.1, D.2, I.2, where the D or I refers to a distributive or integrative behavior and the 1 or 2 indicates which party spoke on that turn. Nonsubstantive behaviors (i.e., other behaviors) are thus assumed to have no impact on the future application of distributive or integrative behaviors and were dropped from the analysis, forming a reduced data set. This assumption is intuitively plausible, and some of the evidence supporting it is discussed in the Results section. Given that nonsubstantive behaviors are not expected to influence the use of distributive or integrative behaviors, the elimination of extraneous ''other'' behaviors should make the results easier to interpret.
Homogeneity. Before testing the model, homogeneity of the chain must be established. The homogeneity of a Markov chain refers to the stability of the transition probabilities over time. That is, homogeneity relates to whether patterns of tactical behavior are comparable across the beginning, middle, and end of the negotiation. If they are not comparable, then data from each time period must be analyzed separately. We broke each negotiation session into two, three, and four equal length ''phases'' and tested for homogeneity across these phases. The test for homogeneity gives rise to a sequence of nested models for the data, in which we have one set of transition probabilities for the whole negotiation, a set for each of two equal length phases, for each of three phases, and so forth. We sequentially tested each model within the model at the next level of complication using a likelihood-ratio test against an appropriate 2 distribution (Billingsley, 1961) .
Order. The order of the chain used for hypothesis testing must be derived from the data as it captures the basic structure of dependency in the data set. Since the Markov chain models of increasing order (i.e., r ϭ 1, r ϭ 2 . . .) form a sequence of nested models, we selected an appropriate order model by using a sequential testing procedure described by Anderson and Goodman (1957) . We selected the order of the model by starting with a zeroth order model and iteratively testing against the next higher order model for the reduced chain.
Role effects. Since the two parties in the negotiation had different roles (e.g., one party is told that he/she called the negotiation), a natural question is whether the impact of the two parties on the negotiation process is similar. It is possible that there is a role effect-systematic differences in the transition probabilities for the different roles. We tested the null hypothesis that there is role symmetry with a likelihood ratio test.
Estimation. Under the assumption that the data from different dyads are independent from one another, but dependent within dyads following a common Markov chain model, we computed maximum likelihood estimates (MLEs) of the transition and initial probabilities (Anderson & Goodman, 1957; Billingsley, 1961) . Due to elimination of speaking turns characterized by nonsubstantive comments (e.g., an off-task comment by one of the negotiators), the transition estimates included some transitions across speaking turns, but within negotiators (e.g., D.1 = I.1). In that we were only interested in the effect of one negotiator on the other's behavior, we did not want to include these transitions in our hypothesis tests. Therefore, we calculated hitting probabilities from the MLE estimates.
Hitting probabilities measure only the effect of one negotiator's behavior on the next substantive behavior of the other negotiator (e.g., D.1 = D.2). They explicitly control for and factor out the chance of consecutive behaviors by the first negotiator (e.g., D.1 = I.1). Hitting probabilities capture the following process: given negotiator 1 engages in behavior X, what is the probability that negotiator 2 will respond with behavior Y, regardless of any other behaviors that negotiator 1 might engage in the interim? The hitting probabilities are computed from the transition probabilities and thus incorporate the same information. However, if we use transition probabilities to answer our question, there is a downward bias in our answer because of the small but nontrivial probability that the first negotiator will engage the next behavior (e.g., D.1 = D.1). In this sense, the computation of the hitting probabilities from the transition probabilities factors out the role of repeated behaviors in assessing the focal behavior of interest.
All probability estimates were computed separately for each of the two conditions because we expected the experimental manipulation to alter the dynamics of the negotiations. We addressed our hypotheses by comparing selected features of the probability estimates in the two conditions.
Computation of standard errors. From an inferential standpoint, the probability estimates are not sufficient to make a comparison; we also need an estimate of their variability. To obtain this estimate, we used a bootstrap resampling method. The bootstrap is a method for approximating the standard errors of complex statistical estimators that are intractable to mathematical analysis. The method works by resampling from the data to approximate the sampling distribution of the statistic in question. To use the bootstrap, one must decide on the unit of sampling-the partitioning of the data from which samples will be drawn-and on how many bootstrap samples to acquire. Ideally, the chosen units will be independent of each other (e.g., data from dyads) because it is more difficult to reproduce the complexity inherent in dependent data. Efron and Tibshirani (1993) provide a comprehensive and accessible account of the bootstrap that touches on the variations and limitations of the method.
We take the data for different dyads to be statistically independent, which is a reasonable assumption since the dyads were randomly assigned and different dyads had no opportunity to influence each other during negotiations. As such, we take the Markov chains from each dyad as the unit of resampling for our bootstrap computations. Approximately 20,000 bootstrap samples were used in the computations of the reported standard errors.
Estimating the distribution of run lengths. To test the durability hypotheses (Hypotheses 4 and 5), we estimated the distribution of run lengths-the number of times one party exhibited a distributive or integrative behavior in a row, regardless of the behavior of the other party. If subjects with tactical knowledge act in a way consistent with Hypotheses 4 and 5, then the run-length distributions for integrative and distributive behaviors should be significantly shifted up and down, respectively.
To understand the run-length distributions, fix a role (say 1) and a behavior (say I). First, we start with the sequence X = I.1, where we assume a second-order chain with I.1 representing the behavior at time t Ϫ 1 and X replacing the time t Ϫ 2 identifier, denoting the set of all four combinations of behaviors and negotiators for that time (I.1, I.2, D.1, D.2). Then, the sequences {X = I.1 = I.2 = D.1} and {X = I.1 = D.2 = I.1 = D.2 = D.1} have integrative behavior run-lengths of 1 and 2, respectively. There is a run-length distribution for each of four behaviors X and for each of I.1 and D.1. In order to get a single, interpretable measure of durability we use the estimated probability of a run of length greater than or equal to 2.
RESULTS
Manipulation Check
As stated earlier, subjects in the TK (tactical knowledge presented) condition were given a questionnaire asking them to state the meaning of each of the tactics in their own words. Negotiators in 28 of the 45 dyads in the TK condition made slightly more than one error (of six possible errors) recalling the tactics (M ϭ 1.07, SD ϭ 1.07) and had to be corrected by the experimenter. This manipulation check was not provided to subjects in the NTK condition, because we did not want subjects to deduce the tactics from the labels presented. Thus, while it is possible that subjects in the NTK held the knowledge provided to the TK subjects, previous research suggests this is probably not the case. As noted, naive negotiators tend to hold a zero-sum assumption (Thompson & Hastie, 1990 ) and primarily use distributive tactics by default .
Integrative Versus Distributive Behaviors
Prior to the testing of the hypotheses, it must be demonstrated that the categorizations of tactical behaviors as distributive or integrative are accurate. Previous analysis of these data (Weingart et al., 1996) has demonstrated that all of the integrative behaviors measured here, multi-issue offers, informationpriorities, and questions-priorities, were positively related to joint outcome. In addition, two of the four distributive behaviors, single-issue offers and substantiation, were negatively related to joint outcome (Weingart et al., 1996) . The other two (information-preferences and questions-preferences) were not related to joint outcome. 6 In addition, a principal components analysis (with varimax rotation) of the frequency of use of the integrative and distributive tactical behaviors was conducted, with the dyad as the unit of analysis. The finding that a set of behaviors load on a similar factor indicates that the frequency of their use tends to covary (frequencies are reported in Table 1 ). Assuming that integrative tactics tend to be used together and distributive tactics tend to be used together, we would expect them to load on two distinct factors. Results of the analysis provided support for the categorization of tactical behaviors. When the transformed frequency data was forced into a two-factor solution, the majority of the behaviors loaded as expected (see Table 2 ). Multi-issue offers, information-priorities, and question-priorities loaded on the first factor, representing integrative tactics. Single-issue offers, information-preferences, and question-preferences loaded on a second factor, representing distributive tactics. Interestingly, substantiation loaded negatively on the integrative factor, suggesting that the increased use of integrative tactics was also characterized by the decreased use of substantiation. 7 Together, these results provide support for categorizing these tactics as distribu- tive and integrative tactics, as suggested by theories of negotiation behavior. In order to test the hypotheses, we combined multi-issue offers, informationpriorities, and question-priorities into one category, labeled ''integrative tactics'' and single-issue offers, information-preferences, question-preferences, and substantiation into a second category labeled ''distributive tactics.'' All other coded behaviors were put into a third category labeled ''other.''
Testing Characteristics of the Markov Model
Order of the model. The Markov order was calculated separately for each experimental condition to allow for differences caused by the experimental manipulations. Results showed that the independence (zero-order) model was clearly rejected as an appropriate model for either condition (NTK: 2 (159) ϭ 979, p Ͻ .001; TK: 2 (159) ϭ 1711; p Ͻ .001) and the first-order model was rejected in the TK condition ( 2 (180) ϭ 267, p Ͻ .001). The second-order model was not rejected in either condition (NTK: 2 (144) ϭ 118, ns; TK: 2 (144) ϭ 161, ns). The p value for the first-order model was only marginally nonsignificant in the NTK condition, and because the second-order model subsumes the first-order model, we use the second-order model for both conditions. While this may incur slight variance increases for the probability estimates in the NTK condition, we believe that conducting comparisons using second-order models for both conditions is easier to interpret and thus worthwhile.
Homogeneity. The second-order chains were compared across phases using the method described above. Results showed that no differences across phases were found when testing a 2-phase model ( 2 (48) ϭ 43.3, ns). Similar results were found in a 3-and 4-phase test.
Role effects. We tested for differences across the two parties (Florist and Bakery) using the method described earlier. The null hypothesis was not rejected using the second-order model ( 2 (24) ϭ 33, ns); thus, there appear to be no differences in interaction patterns associated with role. This finding of role symmetry allowed us to examine patterns without differentiating across roles. Reduction of data set. Three pieces of evidence supported our decision to eliminate the nonsubstantive or ''other'' behaviors (composed of off-task discussion, procedural comments, clarification questions, and nonsubstantive reactions to previous statements) from our data, forming a reduced set. First, when we used a Markov chain model for the unreduced data set, the relative conditional probabilities of Distributive and Integrative behaviors on the next turn given an occurrence of past Other behaviors do not differ significantly from the corresponding unconditional probabilities. This suggests that the rate of substantive behaviors was independent of the presence of Other behaviors. Second, we fit a model parametrized to indicate the impact over time of the different categories of behavior on future substantive behaviors. The Other category evinced little impact. Third, the qualitative results using the reduced and unreduced sequences were essentially comparable.
Tests of Hypotheses
Hypotheses 1 through 4 focused on response-in-kind to tactical behavior. To test these hypotheses, we made statistical comparisons between estimates of selected probabilities using the computed standard errors. Since the rolesymmetry hypothesis appeared consistent with the data, we used the symmetric model in the estimation of probabilities and standard errors. For the comparisons below, we used the hitting probabilities (i.e., between-negotiator sequences) because we were interested in the interactive sequences. We define response-inkind as occurring when the probability of responding with a similar behavior on the next substantive turn is greater than the probability of responding with a different type of behavior. In that our data set was comprised of two exclusive categories, D and I, response-in-kind is interpreted as D.1 = D.2 or I.1 = I.2. Since our results indicated that a second-order Markov chain model was required, we controlled for the previous behavior, which complicates the analysis somewhat. Fulfillment of the role-symmetry assumption allowed us to collapse across role and consider only half of the potential comparisons.
To test Hypotheses 1 through 4, we defined second-order Markov models of the form: behavior at t Ϫ 2 = behavior at t Ϫ 1 = behavior at t, where the behavior could be distributive (D) or integrative (I). The negotiators in the sequence are distinguished by either a 1 or 2 (could be either the Florist or the Baker). For example, the second-order transition probability associated with the sequence, {I.1 = I.1} = I.2, is the probability that one negotiator engaged in two integrative behaviors {I.1 = I.1} followed by an integrative behavior from the other negotiator (I.2). 8 The probability of the response behavior by the second negotiator (at time t) to the first negotiator (at time t Ϫ 1), conditioned also on the behavior at time t Ϫ 2, is estimated using the hitting probabilities discussed earlier.
Hypothesis 1 stated that tactical behavior would be responded to in-kind. To test this hypothesis, we compared the hitting probabilities to determine whether integrative behaviors (at time t) were more likely to follow integrative than distributive behaviors (at time t Ϫ 1), within each condition. This was done by comparing the upper and lower halves of Columns 2 and 4 in Table 3 . We computed differences within each condition for each relevant pair of hitting probabilities [e.g., Col. 2, Row 1: {D.1 = I.1} = I.2 (.320) minus Col. 2, Row 5: {D.1 =D.1} = I.2 (.144)]. To assess the significance of these differences for all four sets of prior behavior (X), we used the (conservative) Bonferroni correction corresponding to a simultaneous 95% confidence level (i.e., a cut-off of 2.73).
Because there were only two categories in the reduced data set (integrative and distributive), the probability of responding with a distributive behavior was the complement of the probability of responding with an integrative behavior. Therefore, the test for the response-in-kind to distributive behavior is the same as the test for response-in-kind to integrative behavior. That is, if Columns 2 and 4 differ across the top and bottom halves of Table 3 , Columns 1 and 3 must also. Note. D.1, distributive behavior, party 1; D.2, distributive behavior, party 2; I.1, integrative behavior, party 1; I.2, integrative behavior, party 2. Col. 1 through Col. 6, columns 1 to columns 6. Time t, target behavior; t Ϫ 1, integrative or distributive behavior immediately preceding target behavior; t Ϫ 2, integrative or distributive behavior two behaviors prior to target behavior. CI, confidence interval. Values greater than 2.73 are significant; significance holds at the 95% level simultaneously over all comparisons in the table. This cut-off was derived from a family-wise Bonferroni correction.
Results support Hypothesis 1 for all comparisons in both conditions (see Table  4 ), suggesting that when an integrative behavior does occur, it is more likely to be elicited by an integrative behavior than a distributive behavior. This implies that distributive behaviors were also responded to in-kind; distributive behavior was more likely to follow distributive behavior than integrative behavior.
To more effectively distinguish between the responses to integrative versus distributive behaviors, we also tested Hypothesis 1 using the complete transition matrix (i.e., including the effects of one's immediately preceding behavior on oneself) as well as using the unreduced data set (i.e., including the speaking turns with Other behaviors). Although not reported here, results from those analyses were consistent with both hypotheses, showing a strong pattern of response-inkind for distributive behavior and a significant, but weaker, pattern for integrative behaviors.
Hypothesis 2 stated that dyads with tactical knowledge presented (TK) would be more likely to respond to integrative behaviors with integrative behaviors than would dyads without tactical knowledge presented (NTK). To examine this, we compared the set of hitting probabilities for transitions {X = I.1} = I.2 for the TK (Table 3 , upper half, Col. 4) and NTK (Table 3 , upper half, Col. 2) conditions. Hypothesis 2 is supported, as the difference scores (Table 3, upper half, Col. 6) show that under one specific condition, negotiators in the TK condition were more likely to respond to integrative behaviors with integrative behaviors than were negotiators in the NTK condition. Specifically, TK negotiators were more likely to respond with integrative behaviors (than would NTK negotiators), but only when their integrative behavior had been reciprocated (i.e., {I.2 = I.1} = I.2). The presentation of tactics affected the likelihood of response when the other player ''played the game.'' Hypothesis 3 stated that TK dyads would respond to distributive behaviors with Table 3 distributive behaviors to a lesser extent than would NTK dyads. To explore this, we compared hitting probabilities for transitions, {X = D.1} = D.2 for the TK and NTK conditions (Table 3 , lower half, Col. 3 and Col. 1). As can be seen by the difference scores in Table 3 (lower half, Col. 5), negotiators in both conditions were equally likely to respond to distributive behaviors with distributive behaviors. Hypothesis 3 was not supported. Furthermore, these results also do not lend support to the corollary of Hypothesis 3, which stated that TK dyads with tactical knowledge would be more likely to shift from distributive to integrative tactics.
Hypothesis 4 stated that TK dyads with tactical knowledge would persist with integrative behaviors longer than would NTK negotiators, regardless of the behavior of the other party. To test this, we examined the difference across conditions of the estimated probability of a run of length of integrative behaviors greater than or equal to 2. Because the model was of second order, we conditioned on a pair of past behaviors, but due to role symmetry, we only needed to compute this distribution with respect to a single role. Table 5 shows differences across conditions (TK-NTK) for run lengths of integrative behavior {X = I.2}. All differences were positive, showing that, in each case, the run-lengths for integrative behavior were longer in the TK condition. Two comparisons were statistically significant: when the previous (X) behavior was integrative (I.1 or I.2), run-length differences were evidenced. Thus, Hypothesis 4 was supported when two integrative behaviors preceded the run.
Hypothesis 5 stated that TK dyads would persist with distributive behaviors for a shorter time than would NTK dyads. To test this, we examined the difference across conditions of the estimated probability of a run-length of distributive behaviors greater than or equal to 2. Results showed no significant differences across condition or any pattern in the sign of the differences that might be suggestive. Hypothesis 5 was not supported.
Additional Findings
To gain a better understanding of how response-in-kind was instantiated, we informally examined the first order transitions between the individual coded categories. Table 6 shows the transition counts between a behavior (rows) and its 
DISCUSSION
This study was designed to examine the impact of tactical knowledge (manipulated by presenting a list of integrative, distributive, and equivocal negotiation tactics) on the sequence of tactical behavior. Two types of sequential patterns were examined: (1) response-in-kind within (and inversely switching between) distributive and integrative behaviors and (2) durability of integrative and distributive behaviors over time. Three important findings were revealed by the data. First, response-in-kind to distributive behavior was strong, regardless of tactical knowledge. Second, tactical knowledge increased the likelihood of responding in-kind to integrative behavior, but only when one's immediately preceding integrative behavior had been reciprocated. Third, negotiators with tactical knowledge persisted with their integrative strategies, regardless of the behavior of the other party, but only when a pattern of integrative behavior had already been established (i.e., two integrative behaviors had already been exchanged). We discuss each of these findings below.
Response-in-kind was strong for distributive tactical behavior, regardless of the presence of tactical knowledge. This finding provides additional support to that found in distributive negotiations where a norm of reciprocity regarding conces- sions is prevalent (Gouldner, 1960; Komorita & Esser, 1975) and in other studies of integrative negotiations . Our results support those of Putnam and Jones (1982) at a general level-distributive behaviors were responded to in-kind with other distributive behaviors. However, when Putnam and Jones (1982) distinguished between three types of distributive behaviors: offensive, defensive, and information-giving, they found that the patterns of distributive sequences were actually complementary. Offensive moves aimed at impugning an opponent's position were countered with defensive moves building support for one's own position. In contrast, examination of the specific distributive behaviors coded in our study showed response-in-kind. Single-issue offers, info-preferences, and substantiation were responded to directly in-kind. One complementary sequence was found-questions about preferences were answered with information about preferences. This pattern would fit under Putnam's subcategory of information-giving/exchange.
Negotiators in our study responded in-kind to integrative behavior, but to a much lesser extent than they did distributive behavior. When integrative behaviors did occur, they were more likely to follow integrative than distributive behaviors. This occurred at a rate somewhat lower than that found in Putnam and Jones (1982) but higher than that found in . Evidence for the response-in-kind to integrative behavior can also be found in the first order transitions. At the tactical level, multi-issue offers and information about priorities were responded to in kind. However, they were also responded to with substantiation, pointing to the source of interference to integrative response-in-kind. It appears that negotiators would often respond to integrative behaviors with substantiation rather than reciprocate in an integrative fashion.
However, simple models of reciprocity were not sufficient to capture the processes in the data. In testing the assumptions of the Markov model, a second-order chain was revealed. Recall that a second-order chain implies that in order to predict a behavior at time t, one must know the content of the two previous behaviors. Thus, negotiators were not simply reacting to the preceding behavior of the other party, but rather were considering the preceding behavior as a response to the next most recent substantive comment. Rather than merely reacting, negotiators were processing the information in a more complex fashion. This result builds upon Putnam and Jones' (1982) suggestion that the reciprocation of integrative behavior is critical in moving from distributive to integrative bargaining. Whereas they tested this hypothesis using a first-order dependency model, our data demonstrate the role of reciprocity using a second-order model.
Interestingly, this result also exemplifies what Weick (1969) labeled as a ''double interact. '' Weick (1969) stated that the double interact (i.e., behavior of party 1 depends on the previous pattern of behaviors of party 1 and party 2) is a primary pattern for representing interlocked behaviors among two or more persons attempting to organize. Weick (1969) suggests that double interacts are the raw materials in the way people coordinate. That appeared to be the case in this study. If supported in future research, this finding suggests that the larger communication context, represented by reactions to one's own previous behavior, matters when deciding how to behave during a negotiation. This finding could potentially expand upon a tit-for-tat view of negotiation, which uses simple models of reciprocity to guide negotiation. It is also consistent with the interdependence model of negotiation suggested by Putnam (1990) in that, among other things, ''. . . [a tactic's] pattern in a contiguous set of behaviors determines how messages contribute to the integrative and distributive nature of bargaining'' (p. 18).
Future research designed to directly examine the potential existence of a double-interact in negotiation is needed. This would require examination of negotiation patterns in naturalistic dyads and groups as well as more controlled studies of negotiation patterns. For example, integrative or distributive responses of one party, contingent on the behavior of the focal negotiator, could be controlled through the use of a confederate or computer program. The probability of an integrative response in the next speaking turn by the focal negotiator could then be compared to determine what prior patterns drive specific responses.
The current study builds upon previous research on reciprocity in negotiation by examining the role of tactical knowledge. Previous analysis of this data (Weingart et al., 1996) had shown that negotiators with tactical knowledge engaged in integrative behavior to a greater extent than did negotiators without tactical knowledge. The results of the current analysis demonstrate that this increased level of integrative behavior was due to higher rates of response-in-kind to integrative behaviors from the other party, but only when their previous integrative behavior had been reciprocated (a second-order chain of the sort: I.2 = I.1 = I.2). It is possible that the tactical knowledge allowed negotiators to recognize the reciprocation of integrative behavior as a signal of the other party's willingness to shift to a more problem-solving approach to the task. Dyads without tactical knowledge either did not recognize or were not willing to respond to integrative reciprocity on the part of the other party. These results, combined with the results reported in Weingart et al. (1996) , show that negotiators with some tactical knowledge engaged in more integrative behavior and reciprocated those behaviors, and together suggest that these behavior changes resulted in higher joint outcome.
In contrast, negotiators' possession of tactical knowledge did not alter the amount or pattern of their use of distributive tactics. As argued earlier, this probably occurred because the distributive tactics represented a default and persistent approach to negotiation, based on a residual typical win-lose assumption regarding the task (Thompson & Hastie, 1990) . Thus, negotiators already possessed and had access to these tactics entering the experimental session and the presentation of distributive tactical descriptions merely reinforced strategies they might otherwise use. Because the integrative tactics were more novel (i.e., either recently acquired or cued) and less persistent (without strong underlying assumptions or habituation), they were more likely to influence behavior (Weingart et al., 1996) .
Negotiators with tactical knowledge were also more likely to persist in their use of integrative tactics over subsequent speaking turns, but only after two integrative behaviors had already occurred (again captured by the second-order chain). This persistence occurred regardless of whether the other party responded in an integrative or distributive fashion. If we assume that the repeated use of a type of tactic implies a more general strategic approach, interesting, and potentially conflicting, conclusions might be drawn. First, we might conclude that the increased durability of integrative behavior associated with tactical knowledge reflects a lack of response-in-kind. That is, the primary mechanism through which tactical knowledge influences negotiation behavior is through persistence in the presence of potential nonresponsiveness. In contrast, we might conclude that with minimal instruction, negotiators become more sensitive to the integrative behavior exhibited and are more likely to respond in-kind. This conclusion can be drawn from the evidence that durability of integrative behavior only occurred in response to two prior integrative behaviors.
However, a more complete explanation, incorporating both of the conclusions drawn above, is warranted. It appears that while minimally instructed negotiators can be more successful at maintaining an integrative strategy, some reciprocity is needed to drive this sustained behavior. That is, tactical knowledge facilitates the recognition of patterns of integrative behavior and response-in-kind. Once this pattern has been established, negotiators with tactical knowledge are more willing to maintain their integrative strategy, even in the face of potential distributive behavior from the other party. This conclusion is supported by the findings that negotiators with tactical knowledge were not more likely to (a) shift from distributive to integrative tactics, but were more likely to (b) respond to an integrative behavior with another integrative behavior and to (c) persist in the use of integrative behaviors, as compared to negotiators without tactical knowledge. Without the simple instruction (and the associated knowledge), negotiators did not capitalize on the occurrence of integrative behavior, instead switching back to their distributive approach more quickly.
When combined with the results of Weingart et al. (1996) , these data demonstrate the additional insights that can be gained by going beyond a frequencybased approach to the study of negotiator behavior. The results of Weingart et al. (1996) showed that negotiators with tactical knowledge engaged in more integrative behavior than did negotiators without such knowledge. The current analysis demonstrates that tactical knowledge influenced the pattern of integrative behavior, but only when prior behavior sent clear signals as to the strategy-in-use. Thus, integrative behaviors were not merely engaged sporadically, as a means to present solutions to the problem at hand. Instead, all negotiators responded-in-kind to integrative attempts, while negotiators with knowledge maintained integrative behavior for a longer period of time, in response to previous patterns and in the face of potential distributive reactions.
Limitations and Opportunities for Future Research
One potential limitation to this study involves the content of the manipulation of tactical knowledge. Altering the list of tactical descriptions (by including more contentious behaviors, such as making threats or ultimatums, for example) might result in different patterns of tactical behavior. Our goal was to provide a sufficient, but not exhaustive, set of commonly encountered tactics to improve performance on this task. However, it is possible that some of our findings could be idiosyncratic to the content of our manipulation.
Although our hypotheses focused on sequential behavior, we did not include information in the tactical descriptions regarding when negotiators should engage in integrative versus distributive behavior. Future research might include suggestions for sequential behaviors to more directly determine their effects on negotiation behavior and outcomes.
A second limitation involves our inability to draw conclusions about how tactical behavior influences the search for individual and joint gain during the negotiation. We identified when offers were made, but not the content of those offers. Thus, we did not directly capture the concession patterns nor the search for integrative solutions engaged by negotiators. Concession (and compromise) behavior represents the responses negotiators make to the other party's value claiming tactics. While we focused on value claiming tactical behavior, we did not examine concessions made-i.e., the value claimed by a negotiator as compared to his or her previous offer. Tracking offers could provide an interesting mechanism for understanding concession behavior and the negotiators attempt to discover integrative solutions (Weingart & Prietula, 1998) .
A third issue relates to the generalizability of our findings to the types of negotiations occurring in day-to-day business or personal interactions. We believe that it is important to consider how these findings are relevant to negotiation training. Our findings suggest that merely reading descriptions of tactics will alter the tactical behavior patterns of negotiators. However, to effect larger changes as well as changes that last over time and across tasks, alternative instructional methods should be examined. Regardless, the notable issue is the sensitivity of the behavioral sequences to a few written descriptions of optional negotiation tactics.
Finally, the sequential process of negotiation potentially affects several aspects of negotiation outcomes. Thus, it would be interesting to know whether the sequential patterns identified in this study have an effect on relevant negotiation outcomes including quality of the agreement, satisfaction with the agreement, satisfaction with the process, and willingness to negotiate again with the other party. A promising strategy for isolating the relationship between negotiation process and outcomes would be to relate the strength of various second-order transition probabilities to those outcomes. This would require that we estimate the second-order transition probabilities for each negotiating dyad, as opposed to using all of the data to estimate one set of probabilities for each condition. Unfortunately, with our current data, we would need longer chains of behavior within each dyad to obtain reliable estimates of the transition probabilities for each dyad. Therefore, in this study we were unable to test the relationship between sequential processes and outcomes; future research, however, could do so.
The goal of this paper was to determine whether tactical knowledge influences the sequences of tactical behavior engaged by naive negotiators. Distributive behavior was found to dominate the interactions studied here, but tactical knowledge was found to positively influence the reciprocity and durability of integrative behaviors (including making multi-issue offers and sharing information about priorities across issues). It appears that tactical knowledge (as manipulated in this study) increases the frequency of integrative behavior (Weingart et al., 1996) by providing negotiators with the information and impetus to continue integrative exchanges over time. In negotiation, as in other social interactions, knowledge matters.
